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Abstract
Nowadays many employers offer their employees the possibility of an insurance against
too large losses in income when retiring or becoming disabled. This paper models the
optimization problem of the employer when setting up such a so-called pension fund. not
surprisingly, it turns out that the optimal solution depends on the premium the employees
are willing to pay at most for the insurance. Since this is private information for an employ-
ee and hence not known to the employer, he needs to collect information regarding these
maximum premiums. It is shown that in most cases the employer is unable to perfectly
inform himself on these maximum premiums. So, he cannot create the right incentives for
his employees to reveal their maximum premiums truthfully.
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1 Introduction
Because of the growing population of elder people, social systems in many western European
countries experience difficulties in guaranteeing an adequate income after retirement or dis-
ability. Especially those people with a higher income would experience a considerable loss
of income when retiring or becoming disabled. Insurance companies anticipated this situation
by developing several new products which insure people of an income of, say, 90% of their
present income in case of disability, or an additional income above the pension supplied by the
social system after retirement.
Employers on the other hand have to pay social premiums on the salaries paid to their
employees. In the past decade, these premiums have gradually increased, and consequently,
employers continuously look for other means to compensate their employees so as to pay less
social premiums. A solution popular to many employers is creating a so-called ‘pension fund’
which, as the insurance companies do, insures employees against an excessive loss of income.
The difference, however, is the fact that this fund is not an insurance company, but completely
belongs to the employer’s firm, who benefits from this construction due to a decreasing amount
of social premiums that have to be paid.
In this paper we analyze the employer’s decision problem with respect to the format of
such a pension fund. To cover the future claims of the participating employees the employer
establishes a pension fund. In our model we assume that any differences between the total
sum of realized claims and the pension fund’s total capital do not contribute to the employer’s
profit/loss. So, if the total of realized claims turns out to be lower than the pension fund’s
capital, then the profits of the employer do not increase. Similarly, if the total of realized claims
turn out to be higher then the profits of the employer do not decrease. This means that the
employer only benefits from the pension fund through a decrease in the social premiums that
have to be paid. The pension fund, however, must be such that the probability that the total
claims exceed the available capital is sufficiently low. So, roughly speaking, the employer’s
objective is to maximize the reduction in social premiums that have to be paid, subject to the
earlier mentioned solvability constraint.
This paper focuses attention on the determination of the optimal insurance premium.
This premium is the same for all insured employees. So, the employer is not allowed to
discriminate between his employees. Reason for this assumption is that in some countrie,
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The Netherlands for example, price discrimination in this regard is illegal. For determining
this insurance premium the employer lacks some vital information, namely, how much the
employees want to pay at most for this insurance. In order to get this information the employer
could simply ask each of his employees to tell him what insurance premium he wants to pay at
maximum. Then, given this information, he could determine the optimal insurance premium.
Acting in this way the employer implicitly assumes that his employees are honest and truthfully
reveal their maximum premiums. The possibility of any strategic behavior by the employees is
undeservingly ignored. The employees, however, could induce a lower insurance premium by
not reporting the true maximum premium but another, lower one. Consequently, the employer
would charge a lower premium than he would have charged in the optimum, resulting in less
than optimal profits.
Summarizing, it is not as much the determination of the optimal insurance premium that
poses any problems to the employer, but the acquisition of the correct information. To answer
the question whether it is indeed possible for the employer to get the correct information or not
we turn to implementation theory.
For surveys on implementation theory the reader is referred to Moore (1992) and Palfrey
(1992). Now, let us try to explain what implementation theory is all about. Consider the
employer and his employees and suppose that i is the true maximum premium of employee
i. If the employer exactly knows these premiums, he can determine the optimal premium .
Unfortunately he will not exactly know the premiumsi in advance, so he cannot determine this
optimal solution . Instead, he can design a mechanism (or game) in which the employees
participate, that yields him some information regarding these maximum premiums i the
employees are willing to pay. Based on this (possibly biased) information he can solve his
optimization problem resulting in a premium ̂. The problem is called implementable if
the employer can design a game such that the outcome ̂ of this game coincides with the
optimal outcome . The interpretation is that the employer gets perfectly informed on the
maximum premiums when applying this specific game, since the outcome ̂ of this game
coincides with the outcome  that the employer would have chosen if he knew the maximum
premiums beforehand. Summarizing, the employer’s decision problem is implementable if he
can construct a mechanism for which the outcomes coincide with the outcomes that are optimal
from his point of view.
Unfortunately for the employer, it is shown that under rather weak conditions the em-
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ployer’s decision problem is not implementable. This means that there exists no mechanism,
how clever or complex it may be designed, that provides the employer with the information he
needs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 then
states the Bayesian implementation framework. Furthermore, it is shown that the employer’s
decision problem is not Bayesian implementable. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We start with explaining the model in the context of pension funds, that is, insurances that
guarantee employees of a sufficiently high income after retirement. Then we show that by
changing the meaning of some of the variables, this model also applies for disability insurances
that guarantee employees of a sufficiently high income once they become disabled.
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of employees and denote the employer by E. The
employer and the employees are assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers with
utility functions ui and uE, respectively. Next, let t = 1 denote the starting year of the pension
fund. Define for each employee i 2 N
Ni the remaining lifetime of employee i;
Pi the year in which employee i plans to retire;
wit the wage of employee i in year t, wit  0;
yit the pension provided by the government to employee i in year t, yit  0;
Eit the additional pension payments in year t for which employee i can take an insurance.
It is assumed that both death and retirement occur at the end of a year. Furthermore, we
introduce
 tax rate on income, t 2 (0; 1);
g the social security premiums that have to be paid by the employer, expressed as a
percentage of the employees’ wages;
 discount rate,  2 [0; 1].
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Note that the remaining lifetime Ni of employee i is a random variable and that Pi and Eit may
be random variables1. Also note that wages and pension payments may vary over the years.
Furthermore, let T be the year for which all employees have deceased with probability one.
So, the time span that is considered covers the period from t = 1 to t = T . Next, we assume
that pension/insurance premiums can be expressed as a percentage of the employee’s wage wit.
Moreover, since it is illegal - at least in The Netherlands - for the employer to discriminate
between his employees with respect to the insurance premium, each employee that participates
in the pension fund pays the same percentage of his wage as insurance premium. Insurance
companies operating on the market, however, are allowed to discriminate between the premiums
that individuals have to pay for an insurance.
Now suppose that the employer organizes a pension fund for his employees and that the
premium equals a percentage  2 (0; 1) of the wage. Then employee i 2 N has three different
actions at his disposal.
First, he can decide to take no insurance at all. Then his payoff in year t equals (1  )wit
if employee i is still working in year t, (1    )yit if employee i is retired in year t, and zero if
employee i is no longer alive in year t. Thus, employee i’s discounted payoff over the period
of T years equals
min(Pi;Ni)X
t=1
t(1    )wit +
NiX
t=Pi+1
t(1    )yit; (1)
where the latter sum equals zero if Pi + 1 > Ni.
Second, employee i can decide to insure his income after retirement at an existing
insurance company. Then his payoff in year t equals (1    )wit   mi wit if employee i is still
working in year t. Note that the premium mi wit employee i pays in year t is a percentage 
m
i
of his wage and that it may depend on i. His payoff equals (1   )(yit + Eit) if employee i is
already retired in year t. Recall that Eit equals the payment that is provided by the insurance
and that it may vary over the years. Finally, his payoff equals zero if employee i is no longer
alive in year t. So, employee i’s discounted payoff over T years equals
min(Pi;Ni)X
t=1





t(1   )(yit + Eit): (2)
The third and final possibility for employee i is to participate in the employer’s pension
fund. Then his payoff equals (1    )(wit   wit) if employee i is working in year t. Note
1We assume that all random variables are measurable functions with finite expectations.
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that the premium wit employee i pays in year t may be deducted from his gross wage, which
decreases the total amount of tax payments. His payoff equals (1   )(yit+Eit) if employee i
has already retired in year t, and his payoff equals zero if employee i is no longer alive in year
t. So, in this case employee i’s discounted payoff over T years equals
min(Pi;Ni)X
t=1





t(1   )(yit + Eit): (3)
Out of the three options considered above, employee i chooses the one that maximizes his
expected utility. Moreover, taking the premiums charged by the existing insurance companies
as given, employee i can determine the maximum premium  he is willing to pay at most
for participation in the pension fund. Let i denote employee i’s maximum premium. Then
without loss of generality we may assume that 1  2  : : :  n.
Given these maximum premiums i we can consider the employer’s decision problem.
First, of course, the employer has to decide whether or not he starts a pension fund for his
employees. If he decides to do so, then he has to determine the premium that the employees
have to pay for participating in the pension fund. Furthermore, he has to decide how much
he contributes himself to the pension fund’s capital every year. This contribution in year t is
denoted by ct 2 IR. An incentive for the employer to contribute to the pension fund is the
following. The contributions ct enable the employer to lower the premium, possibly resulting
in more employees participating in the pension fund, which yields that less social premiums
have to be paid. Hence, the benefits of the employer may increase.
Suppose the employer does not organize a pension fund for his employees. In that case




t=1 (1 + g)wit, that is, the wages he has to pay to his
employees plus the social premiums.
Next, suppose that he does organize a pension fund. Then, given a premium , employee
i participates in the pension fund if   i, that is, if the premium is less than or equal to
the maximum premium he is willing to pay for the insurance. So in case of indifference
we assume that he participates. Then the number m() of employees that participate equals
m() = jfi 2 N j  igj. Moreover, since we assumed that 1  2  : : :  n it holds
that i   for i = 1; 2; : : : ;m() and i <  for i = m() + 1; : : : ; n. The employer’s
payoff in year t with respect to a working employee i equals  (1+ g)(wit wit) if employee
i participates in the pension fund, and it equals  (1 + g)wit if he does not. Note that the
premium may be deducted from the employee’s gross wage, resulting in a decrease in social
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premiums that have to be paid. With respect to a retired employee i, the employer’s payoff
in year t equals  Eit if employee i participates in the pension fund, and it equals zero if he
does not. Furthermore, the employer contributes in year t an amount ct to the pension fund’s






















There are, however, solvability constraints on the pension fund’s capital that have to
be satisfied. For each year t the probability that the total amount of money claimed thus far
















Note that both the claims and the available capital are random variables. The solvability

















A  ; (5)
for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T and  sufficiently small, e.g.,  = 0:05.
Summarizing, the employer chooses  and ct(t = 1; 2; : : : ; T ) such that his expected
utility is maximal given that the solvability restrictions of (5) are satisfied. So, the employer’s
















































for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T .
(6)
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Note that if the resulting expected utility is less than the utility level corresponding to
organizing no pension fond, then the employer does, of course, not establish a pension fund
for his employees.
Next, let us take a closer look at the employer’s decision problem. To start with the
solvability constraints, note that probability distribution functions are continuous from the
right. So, given a premium  there exists a contribution c1() of the employer such that the






























for all x < c1(). Thus, if  is the premium then c1() is the optimal contribution in year t = 1
of the employer to the pension fund’s capital. In a similar way, one can calculate the optimal































s.t.: jfi 2 N j  igj = m():
(7)
Next, we show that in the optimum the premium  can be chosen equal to the maximum
premium i of some employee i. For this purpose, let  be a premium such that  6= i for
all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Furthermore, let m = m() be the number of insured employees if the
premium equals . The employer can (weakly) increase his expected utility by setting the
premium equal to m, the premium that employeem is willing to pay at most for the insurance.








































2Let X and Y be random variables. X stochastically dominates Y if IP(X  x)  IP(Y  x) for all x 2 IR.
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Since the payoff corresponding to a premium  can be (weakly) improved by setting the
premium equal to m(), an optimal premium can be found among the maximum premiums i,
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. So, instead of deciding what premium to charge he can decide on how many
employees he wants to insure. If he wants to insure exactly m employees, he sets the premium
equal to m. Note, however, that some values ofm are excluded if several maximum premiums
coincide. For example, if m = m+1 then it is not possible for the employer to insure exactly
m employees. For setting the premium equal to m yieldsm+1 insured employees. Formally,
this means that the employer can only choose among those m for which m > m+1. Let D
denote this domain, i.e.,
D = fm 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ngjm > m+1g [ f0g:
Note that we have also includedm = 0, so that organizing no pension fund is also incorporated
































Remark that the employer’s constrained optimization problem has now been reduced to an
unconstrained optimization problem over a finite number of possibilities.
The problem considered thus far is concerned with the insurance of an (additional)
income after retirement. Now, by changing the meanings of the variablesNi and Pi, this model
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also describes the insurance of an (additional) income when an employer becomes disabled.
For this, define for each employee i
Ni the year in which the insurance payments to employee i end. This, for example, happens
when employee i dies or when he reaches the retirement age, in which case he receives
a pension from the government.;
Pi the year in which employee i becomes disabled;
wit the wage of employee i in year t, wit  0;
yit the payments provided by the government to employee i in year t, yit  0;
Eit the additional income in year t for which employee i can take an insurance;
So, an employee pays premiums for the insurance from t = 1 to t = min(Pi; Ni), and he
receives payments from this insurance from t = Pi + 1 till t = Ni. Note that these are the
same time periods that occur in the model on pensions. Thus the problem formulated in (8)
also applies if the insurance provided by the employer concerns the disability of an employee.
Both insurance problems assume that the employer is perfectly informed on the maximum
premiums i of the employees. Given these maximum premiums he can determine the optimal
solution m of (8), and subsequently he can offer his employees to participate in the pension
fund for a premium m . In reality, however, it is unlikely that an employer is completely
informed on the maximum premiums i his employees are willing to pay for an insurance.
Indeed, this maximum premium is private information for the employee and not known to his
colleagues or his employer.
Since the employer has incomplete knowledge of the maximum premiums i of his
employees, he is not able to solve the optimization problem formulated in (8). To get infor-
mation on these maximum premiums, the employer could approach each of his employees and
ask them to reveal their maximum premiums. Subseqeuntly, he could determine the optimal
solution as described above and announce the premium to his employees. Obtaining informa-
tion in this way, however, has the drawback that employees have incentives to misreport their
maximum premiums. More precisely, employees have a tendency to reveal lower maximum
premiums than the true ones. As a result, the inaccurate information used by the employer
results in a premium that is not optimal for him. Arises the question whether there is some
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other way for the employer to obtain the information he needs. This question is dealt with in
the next section.
3 The Implementation Problem
Acquiring the correct information in order to determine the optimal premium from the em-
ployer’s point of view is known in the literature as an implementation problem. To be more
specific, since employees only have information on their own maximum premium i and not
on the maximum premiums of the other employees, it is a Bayesian implementation problem.
Before we take a more general approach to Bayesian implementation let us elaborate on the
situation described at the end of the previous section: the situation where each employee was
asked to report his maximum premium.
LetN = f1; 2; : : : ; ng denote the set of employees. The maximum premiumi employee
i is willing to pay is determined by his utility function ui. So the fact that the employer does not
know employee i’s maximum premium implies that he also does not know his utility function.
Furthermore, employee i only knows his own utility function and not the utility functions of
all the other employees. Let u = (u1; u2; : : : ; un) denote the vector of utility functions. Such
a vector u is called the state of the world. Recall that the employer has no knowledge about
the state u of utility functions and that employee i only has partial knowledge of the state u,
namely, his own utility function ui. Furthermore, since employees were assumed to be risk
averse expected utility maximizers the set of all possible utility functions for employee i equals
Ui = fui : IR! IRjui is strictly increasing and concaveg;
and the set of all possible state of the world equals U = U1  U2  : : : Un.
To get some information on the true state of the world the employer asks his employees
to reveal their utility functions. Suppose that u = (u1; u2; : : : ; un) denotes the true state of the
world and that û = (û1; û2; : : : ; ûn) denotes the reported state of the world. Given the reported
utility functions ûi, the employer can use expression (3) to determine the maximum premium
(ûi) each employee is willing to pay for the insurance. Subsequently, he uses these maximum
premiums to solve his optimization problem formulated in (8), yielding an optimal premium
(û) that depends on the reported utility functions û = (û1; û2; : : : ; ûn). Then the employer
rules that employees have to participate in the pension fund if the premium (û) charged
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by the employer is less than or equal to the reported maximum premium (ûi). Employees
are not allowed to participate if the premium (û) exceeds the reported maximum premium.
Moreover, the employees know beforehand that this rule applies. So, they can take this into
account when deciding which utility function to reveal. At first sight this rule might seem a
bit restrictive compared to the more realistic case where the employees may decide themselves
whether or not they want to participate in the pension fund when the premium equals (û).
We will show later on though, that for our main result it does not matter which of the two rules
apply.
Given the premium (û) employee i participates in the pension fund if (ûi)  (û),
yielding the payoff (cf. (3))
min(Pi;Ni)X
t=1




t(1   )(yit + Eit):
On the other hand, if (ûi) < (û) employee i does not participate. His payoff then equals
min(Pi;Ni)X
t=1
t(1    )wit +
NiX
t=Pi+1









t(1    )(yit + Eit);
depending on which of the two outside options employee i prefers most, that is, no insurance
or insurance with an existing insurance company (cf. (1) and (2)).
Let hi (û) denote the payoff to employee i when û is the reported state of the world
and let h(û) = (h1(û); h

2(û); : : : ; h

n(û)). The expected utility for employee i then equals
E(ui(h

i (û))). Note that the payoff h

i (û) is evaluated by his true utility function ui. Since
hi (û) depends on ûi employee i can influence the outcome by reporting another utility function.
Which utility function he reports depends on the strategy he plays.
A strategy i for employee i indicates which utility function is reported given the true
utility function. Formally, this means that i is a map assigning to each utility function ui 2 Ui
another utility function ûi 2 Ui, with the interpretation that if ui represents employee i’s true
utility function then he reports the utility function ûi. For example, the strategy that always
reports the true utility function is represented by i(ui) = ui for all ui 2 Ui.
Given the strategies  = (1; 2; : : : ; n) of all employees and the true state of the world
u the payoff to employee i equals hi ((u)), where (u) = (1(u1); 2(u2); : : : ; n(un)).
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The corresponding expected utility then equals E(ui(hi ((u)))). Determining this expected
utility, however, is impossible considering the fact that employee i does not completely know
the state u. In fact, he only knows his own utility function ui. To circumvent this problem,
each employee i has beliefs about the true state u. These beliefs are represented by a prior
probability measure i(ui) on U i = j 6=iUj and may depend on the true utility function ui of







Furthermore, given that  i describe the strategies of the other employees, employee i (weakly)
prefers a strategy i to a strategy ̂i if the expected utility of i is greater than or equal to the











where  i(u i) = (j(uj))j 6=i.
A strategyvector  is called a Bayesian equilibrium if for each employee i and each
possible true utility functionui the strategy i maximizes his expected utility given the strategies
 i of the other employees. Mathematically, this means that for each i 2 N , each ui 2 Ui, and












The payoff function h is called incentive compatible if reporting the true utility function
is a Bayesian equilibrium. Substituting in (9) that reporting the truth is the strategy (u) = u












holds for all i 2 N and all ui; ûi 2 Ui.
Summarizing, if h is incentive compatible then revealing the true utility functions is a
Bayesian equilibrium. This means from an equilibrium point of view that the employer becomes
correctly informed on the true utility functions and, consequently, that he charges the optimal
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insurance premium that yields him maximal benefits. The next theorem, however, shows that
under some conditions the payoff function h does not satisfy incentive compatibility. Hence,
the employer can not expect to get perfect information on the true utility functions.
To specify the conditions take i 2 N and ui 2 Ui. Let  i  IR
n 1 be the set of all
possible maximum premiums (u i) = ((uj))j 6=i. Thus,
 i = f(u i)ju i 2 U ig:
Next, let B be a Borel set in  i and define the set V (B)  U i by
V (B) = fu i 2 U ij(u i 2 Bg;
as the set of all utility functions u i of the other employees such that the corresponding vector
of maximum premiums belongs to B.
Theorem 3.1 Let  denote the Lebesgue measure on IRn 1. If there exists an employee i 2 N
and a utility function ui 2 Ui with a prior probability measure i(ui) such that for every Borel
set B   i it holds that
(B) > 0 if and only if i(ui)(V (B)) > 0;
then h is not incentive compatible.
PROOF: See Appendix A.
The condition is satisfied for sure if there exists an employee i and a utility function
ui such that the density function corresponding to this employee’s prior probability measure
i(ui) is strictly positive.
Since the payoff function h is not incentive compatible, the employer cannot get the
information he needs by just asking his employees. This is, however, only one way to get
information. The employer could, of course, design other methods to receive information on
the maximum premiums of his employees. These other methods are described by so-called
mechanisms.
A mechanism is a pair (A;), where A = A1 A2 : : :An with Ai the action space
of employee i and  the payoff function, assigning to each action a 2 A a (stochastic) payoff
to each employee. For example, in the previously described mechanism where each employee
reports his utility function, an action for employee i consists of reporting a utility function.
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This implies that Ai = Ui for all i 2 N and that A = U . Furthermore, the payoff function  is
described by h, i.e., (a) = h(a) for all a 2 A.
Similar to the mechanism (U; h) we can define strategies for employee i in a mechanism
(A;). A strategy for employee i is a map i : Ui ! Ai with the interpretation that employee
i takes action i(ui) 2 Ai if ui is his true utility function.
Given the strategies  of all employees, the payoff to employee i equals i((u)) if u is





Furthermore, employee i (weakly) prefers the strategy i to the strategy ̂i if the expected







A strategyvector  is then called a Bayesian equilibrium if for each employee i and
each possible true utility function ui the strategy i maximizes his expected utility given the
strategies  i of the remaining employees. Mathematically,  is a Bayesian equilibrium if for








Now, consider again the problem from the employer’s point of view. If u 2 U are the
true utility functions then he would like the payoffs to the employees to be equal to h(u),
since this corresponds to maximal benefits for the employer. To be sure that his benefits are
maximal for each possible state u, the employer has to design the mechanism (A;) in such a
way that every Bayesian equilibrium  yields him the payoff ((u)) = h(u) for all u 2 U .
If he can indeed construct such a mechanism then the payoff function h is called Bayesian
implementable.
Similar to Bayesian implementation with a finite number of states of the world (see
Jackson (1991)) one can easily show that incentive compatibility as formulated in (10) is a
necessary condition or h to be Bayesian implementable. To see this, suppose that h is
Bayesian implementable but not incentive compatible. Then some employee i is better off in
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the revelation mechanism (U; h) by pretending that some ûi is his true utility function instead
of his true utility function ui. But since each Bayesian equilibrium  in the mechanism (A;)
yields him the payoff i((u)) = hi (u) he could improve his payoff in this same mechanism
(A;) by acting as if ûi is his utility function instead of ui, that is, take the action i(ûi) instead
of i(ui). Obviously, this contradicts the fact that  is a Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, the
payoff function h must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Theorem 3.1 showed that under rather weak conditions, the payoff function h does
not satisfy the incentive compatibility property. This implies that h is also not Bayesian
implementable. Thus there exists no mechanism, how complex or clever it may be designed,
that gives the employer the correct information regarding the utility functions of his employees.
4 Remarks
Theorem 3.1 tells us that under some conditions the employer is not able to perfectly inform
himself on the maximum premiums of his employees. Recall that the payoff function desired
by the employer was chosen in such a way that employees can only participate in the pension
fund if the maximum premium they report does not exceed the premium set by the employer.
So, in fact, the employer decided whether an employee got the insurance or not. As already
mentioned, a natural (and maybe more realistic) adjustment of this payoff function is to let the
employees decide whether they want to participate or not. So, given the information revealed by
the employees, the employer sets an insurance premium and each employee decides individually
if he participates or not. This payoff function, however, does also not satisfy the incentive
compatibility property. This can easily be seen as follows. Suppose that it did satisfy incentive
compatibility. Then revealing the true utility function would be a Bayesian equilibrium. But
if each employee reveals his true utility function then it does not matter whether the employer
decides on the participation of an employee in the pension fund, or the employee himself
decides this. So if the adjusted payoff function satisfies incentive compatibility, then so does
the original payoff function. Since the latter is not true, the adjusted payoff function can not
be incentive compatible.
In proving the impossibility theorem we have put no restrictions on the set of possible
utility functions Ui. So Ui contains any strictly increasing and concave utility function. This
guarantees that for any ‘reasonable’ insurance premium there exists a utility function such
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that the corresponding maximum premium equals the aforementioned insurance premium.
In this context, reasonable means that the premium should be at least the expected loss of
income. This is due to the risk averse behavior of the employees. Furthermore, the premium
should not exceed the maximum amount that theoretically can be received from the insurance.
Taking this notion of reasonability into account, it is not difficult to see that Theorem 3.1 still
holds if the set of utility functions Ui is restricted in such a way, that for every ‘reasonable’
insurance premium there still exists a utility function in Ui for which the corresponding
maximum premium equals this insurance premium. An example of such a restricted Ui is
Ui = fui(t) =  e
 ait; t 2 IRjai > 0g. An incidental benefit in this case is that the beliefs
of employee i on the utility functions of the remaining employees can be described by a
probability distribution on a i, i.e., the parameters that determine the utility functions of
the other employees. Furthermore, the condition formulated in Theorem 3.1 holds for any
continuous probability distribution on a i with strictly positive density function.
The overall consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that there is no need for the employer to
organize a (complex) mechanism to acquire information when setting up a pension fund for his
employees, since all the information revealed by the employees cannot be rated at its true value.
The alternatives left for the employer are either to get the information elsewhere (if possible)
or to set an insurance premium independent of the information revealed by the employees. for
the actual height of the premium the employer could use the market premium as an indication.
Finally, it should be noted that a mechanism (A;) includes many ways of collecting
information on the maximum premiums of the employees. For example, by introducing
individual taxes the employer can discriminate between individual employees. Although such
a mechanism is illegal in our model, the main result does not change if it would be allowed.
So, even if the employer is allowed to discriminate between his employees, he can not get
perfectly informed on the maximum premiums.
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5 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1
The outline of the proof is as follows. To show our main result we only consider deviations
by employees to utility functions yielding a lower maximum premium. This turns out to be
sufficient to show that h is not incentive compatible. The proof consists of five parts. In the
first part of the proof we examine how the premium changes when an employee deviates from
revealing his true utility function. The second part focuses on the cases for which deviating
decreases the expected utility of an employee, while the third part considers the cases for which
deviating increases his expected utility. In the fourth part of the proof we deduce a necessary
condition on h to satisfy incentive compatibility. The fifth and final part then shows that this
necessary condition cannot be satisfied.
Throughout this proof let the true utility function ui of employee i be fixed and let (ui)
denote the maximum premium corresponding to ui. Furthermore, let (û) denote the optimal
premium set by the employer when utility functions û are revealed. Finally, we make the
following assumptions. First, all employees are identical. So, Ni, Pi, wit, yit, and Eit do not
depend on i. Second, since fx 2 IRnjxi = (ui);9j2N : xj = (ui)g is a set with Lebesgue
measure zero, it follows that fû i 2 U ij9j2N : (ûj) = (ui)g has probability measure zero
with respect to i(ui). Hence, we can restrict our attention to
Û = fû 2 U j8j;i2N : (ûj) 6= (ui)g:
So, in every state of the world no two employees can have the same maximum premium. Third,
we assume that if an employee deviates then he reports a utility function with a lower maximum
premium than the one corresponding to his true utility function.
Let us start with examining how the premium  changes when employee i reveals ûi
instead of his true utility function ui. Note that by assumption (ui) > (ûi). Consider
û i 2 Û i and let m(~u) denote the m-highest maximum premium when ~u are the reported
utility functions, i.e., 1(~u)  2(~u)  : : :  n(~u). The employer’s optimization problem

































D(~u) = fm 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ngjm(~u) > m+1(~u)g [ f0g:
To see how the premium  changes when employee i reveals the utility function ûi
instead of ui, we distinguish three cases, namely, (ui) < (ui; û i), (ui) > (ui; û i),
and (ui) = (ui; û i). These cases are graphically presented in Figure 1 on page 27
. In each graph the height of a bar represents the maximum premium that is reported by an
employee. Note that the employees are placed in decreasing order with respect to the reported
maximum premium.
Case 1: In this situation we have that (ui) < (ui; û i). So, employee i does not get an
insurance from the employer. Now, suppose that employee i reports a utility function ûi with
(ûi) < (ui). Note that if the employer charges the premium (ui; û i) then his expected
utility is the same in both of the reported states of the world (ui; û i) and (ûi; û i).
If (ui) > (ûi) > (ûj) with j as depicted in Case 1 of Figure 1, then the optimal
solution of (12) does not change, that is, (ûi; û i) = (ui; û i). Indeed, the only case
for which the value of the objective function in (12) changes is when the employer sets the
premium equal to m(ûi; û i) = (ûi). Since (ûi) < (ui), this change is negative.
If (ûj) > (ûi) > (ûk) with j and k as depicted in Case 1 of Figure 1, then the
optimal solution can change. In this case the value of the objective function changes when
the employer charges the premium m(ûi; û i) = (ûi) or m(ûi; û i) = (ûj). The first,
however, cannot be optimal. To see this, consider the following two states, (ui; û i) and
(ûi; û i). If the employer charges the premium (ûj) in state (ui; û i) and (ûi) in state
(ûi; û i), then the same set of employees get the insurance. Since (ui) < (ûj) this means
that the employer’s expected utility is higher in state (ui; û i) than in state (ûi; û i). So, if
(ûj) would be the optimal premium in state (ûi; û i) then charging the premium (ûi) yields
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a higher expected utility than charging (ui; û i). But then charging (ui) in state (ui; û i)
must also yield a higher expected utility than (ui; û i). This contradicts the optimality of
(ui; û i) in state (ui; û i). Hence, (ûi) cannot be optimal. A similar argument holds if
the employer charges the premium (ûj). So, for the optimal premium (ûi; û i) we have
that (ûi; û i) = (ui; û i). Moreover, since (ûi) < (ûi; û i) it follows that employee
i does not participate in the pension fund.
If (hui) < (ûk) than it follows from the same argument as above that (ûi) <
(ûi; û i) = 
(ui; û i).
Summarizing Case 1, if (ui) < (ui; û i) then (ûi) < (ûi; û i) if (ûi) < (ui).
So, if employee i is not allowed to partcipate in the pension fund when he reveals his true
utility function ui, then he also is not allowed to participate when he reports a utility function
ûi with a lower maximum premium (ûi) < (ui).
Case 2: In the second situation, that is, (ui) > (ui; û i), we have that employee i gets the
insurance from his employer. Again, suppose that employee i reports a utility function ûi with
(ûi) < (ui).
If (ui) > (ûi)  (ûj) with j as depicted in Case 2 of Figure 1, then the optimum
does not change. So, (ûi; û i) = (ui; û i).
If (ûj) > (ûi)  (ûk) with j and k as depicted in Case 2 of Figure 1, then the
value of the objective function in (12) only changes if the employer charges the premium
m(ûi; û i) = (ûi) or m(ûi; û i) = (ûj). Now, (ûi) cannot be an optimal premium.
For if (ûi) is optimal in state (ûi; û i) then (ûj) must be optimal in state (ui; û i), which
contradicts the optimality of (ui; û i). A similar argument holds if the premium equals
(ûj). Thus, for the optimal premium (ûi; û i) we have that (ûi; û i) = (ui; û i).
If (ui; û i)  (ûi) < (ûk) then by the same argument as above it follows that
(ûi; û i) = 
(ui; û i).
Summarizing Case 2, if (ui; û i) < (ui) then (ûi; û i) = (ui; û i) for all ûi
satisfying (ui; û i)  (ûi) < (ui). This means that employee i still participates in the
pension fund if he reports a maximum premium of at least (ui; û i) and at most (ui).
Case 3: In the third and final case we have that (ui) = (ui; û i). Suppose employee i
steadily decreases his reported maximum premium and let (~ui) < (ui) be the first utility
function for which (~ui) 6= (~ui; ûi). Then either(~ui) < 
(~ui; û i) or (~ui) > (~ui; û i).
If the first possibility occurs, we know from Case 1 that (ûi) < (ûi; û i) for all ûi
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with (ûi) < (~ui). If the latter possibility occurs then Case 2 applies. This means that
(ûi; û i) = 
(~ui; ûi) for all ûi satisfying 
(~ui; û i)  (ûi) < (~ui).
Summarizing Case 3, if the premium  increases due to the fact employee i reports
another, lower maximum premium (ûi), then this implies that employee i does not get any
insurance when reporting (ûi), that is, (ûi) < (ûi; û i).
Now let us start with the second part of the proof. If the expected utility of employee i
decreases when he reports ûi instead of ui then one of the following two possibility applies:
either he gets the insurance for a higher premium, or he gets the insurance when reporting ui
whereas he does not get it when reporting ûi.
Let us begin with the first possibility, that is, he can still participate in the pension fund
but for a higher premium. This means that (ui)  (ui; û i), (ûi)  (ûi; û i), and
(ui; û i) < 
(ûi; û i). Since employee i gets the insurance when reporting ui the cases 2
and 3 of Figure 1 apply. From the first part of this proof follows that, if (ui)  (ui; û i)
and the optimal premium increases when (ûi) is reported instead of (ui) then (ûi) <
(ûi; û i). This implies that employee i cannot partcipate in the pension fund. Hence, the
case that employee i participates for a higher premium when deviating cannot occur.
The only possibility left for which the expected utility of employee i decreases is, if he
gets the insurance when reporting ui whereas he does not get it when reporting ûi. This means
that (ui; û i)  (ui) and (ûi; û i) > (ûi). Recall that when employee i is not allowed
to participate in the pension fund if he reports ûi, then his payoff hi (ûi; û i) equals
min(Pi;Ni)X
t=1
t(1    )wit +
NiX
t=Pi+1









t(1   )(yit + Eit);
depending on which of the two outside options employee i prefers most, that is, no additional
pension or one with an existing insurance company. From the definition of (ui) it then follows
that E(ui(hi (ûi; û i))) equals the expected utility of employee i when he participates in the
pension fund for his maximum premium (ui), that is
E(ui(h

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For ease of notation let us abbreviate the right hand side to((ui)). SinceE(ui(hi (ûi; û i))) =
((ui)) this also implies that employee i is indifferent between participating in the pension
fund and not participating if (ui; û i) = (ui). So, in that case, reporting ûi instead of ui
does not decrease his expected utility. Next, define
L(ûi) = fû i 2 Û ij
(ui; û i) < (ui) and (ûi; û i) > (ûi)g;
as the set of all û i for which revealing ûi instead of ui strictly decreases the expected utility.
Recall from the first part of the proof that (ui; û i) > (ûi) for all û i 2 L(ûi).
For the third of the proof let us focus on the case that the expected utility increases. This
is the case when either employee i participates in the pension fund for a lower premium, or
employee i participates when reporting ûi whereas he cannot participate when reporting ui.
Let us start with the latter possibility. This implies that (ûi; û i)  (ûi) < (ui) <
(ui; û i). Since (ui) < (ui; û i) Case 1 applies. From the first part of the proof we know
that if (ui) < (ui; û i) and (ûi) < (ui) then also (ûi) < (ûi; û i). So, employee i
can also not participate in the pension fund when he reports ûi. Thus, the case that employee i
does not participate in the pension fund when reporting ui but does participate when reporting
ûi cannot occur.
The remaining possibility is the one where employee i gets the insurance for a lower
premium. Thus, (ûi; û i)  (ûi), (ui; û i)  (ui), and (ûi; û i) < (ui; û i). In
fact, to show that h is not incentive compatible it is sufficient to consider only those cases
where (ûi; û i)  (ûi) < (ui) = (ui; û i). Let W (ûi) denote the set of all û i
satisfying this condition, that is,
W (ûi) = fû i 2 Û ij
(ûi; û i)  (ûi) < (ui) = 
(ui; û i)g:
Then the expected utility of employee i increases when reporting ûi instead of ui if û i 2
W (ûi). Moreover, since (ui; û i) = (ui) it holds that E(ui(hi (ui; û i))) = ((ui)) for
all û i 2 W (ûi).
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Now, let us turn to the fourth part of the proof. If the payoff functionh satisfies incentive












for all ûi 2 Ui. In particular, this holds for ûi 2 Ui such that (ûi) < (ui). Note that deviating
to ûi decreases the expected utility of employee iwhen û i 2 L(ûi) and increases the expected
utility when û i 2 W (ûi). So, if deviating to ûi is not profitable, then the total loss incurred
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for all ûi 2 Ui with (ûi) < (ui). Since û i 2 L(ûi) we know from expression (13) that
E(ui(h

i (ûi; û i))) = ((ui)). Furthermore, since û i 2 W (ûi) implies that 
(ui; û i) =
(ui), it also holds that E(ui(hi (ui; û i))) = ((ui)). Hence, if h









i (ûi; û i)))   ((ui))di(ui)
(14)




i (ui; û i))) < ((ûi)): (15)
Similarly, since û i 2 W (ûi) implies that(ûi; û i)  (ûi) it follows thatE(ui(hi (ûi; û i))) 
((ûi)). Thus if inequality (14) holds for all ûi 2 Ui with (ûi) < (ui), it must also hold
true thatZ
L(ûi)
((ûi))   ((ui))di(ui) Z
W (ûi)
((ûi))   ((ui))di(ui):







or, equivalently, that i(ui)(L(ûi))  i(ui)(W (ûi)) for all ûi 2 Ui with (ûi) < (ui).
Summarizing, if h is incentive compatible then for all i 2 N and all ui; ûi 2 Ui such
that (ûi) < (ui) it holds that i(ui)(L(ûi))  i(ui)(W (ûi)).
For the fifth and final step of the proof we need the following two lemmas. The first
lemma shows that L(ûi) is decreasing in (ûi). The second lemma shows that W (ûi) is
increasing in (ûi).
Lemma 5.1 Let ûi; ~ui; ui 2 Ui be such that (ûi) < (~ui) < (ui). Then L(~ui)  L(ûi).
PROOF: Take û i 2 L(~ui). Then (~ui) < (~ui; û i) and (ui) > (ui; û i). From
(~ui) < 
(~ui; ûi) it follows that Case 1 - discussed in the first part of the proof - applies.
Since (ûi) < (~ui) this implies that (ûi) < (ûi; û i). Hence, û i 2 L(ûi). 2
Lemma 5.2 Let ûi; ~ui; ui 2 Ui be such that (ûi) < (~ui) < (ui). Then W (ûi)  W (~ui).
PROOF: Take ûi 2 W (ûi). So, (ui) = (ui; û i) > (ûi)  (ûi; û i). Since
(ui) = 
(ui; û i) it follows that Case 3 - discussed in the first part of the proof - ap-
plies. Hence, from (~ui) > (ûi)  (ûi; û i) it follows that (~ui)  (~ui; û i). Then
(ui; û i) = (ui) > (~ui) implies that (ui; û i) > (~ui; û i). Thus, û i 2 W (~ui). 2
Next, consider a sequence (ûki )k2IN such that (û
k
i ) < (û
k+1
i ) for all k 2 IN and
limk!1 (û
k
i ) = (ui). Then for all k 2 IN it holds that i(ui)(L(û
k
i ))  i(ui)(W (û
k
i )).
Since 0  i(ui)(L(ûki ))  1 for all k 2 IN and L(û
1
i )  L(û
2






is a decreasing convergent sequence with limit equal to i(ui)(L), where
L = \k2INL(û
k
i ). Similarly, since 0  i(ui)(W (û
k
i ))  1 for all k 2 IN and W (û
1
i ) 







is an increasing convergent sequence with
limit equal to i(ui)(W ), where W = [k2INW (ûki ). Moreover, i(ui)(L)  i(ui)(W ).
Now it holds that L = \k2INL(ûki ) = ;. To see this, recall that
L(ûki ) = fû i 2 Û ij
(ui; û i) < (ui) and (ûki ; û i) > (û
k
i )g;
and that (ui; û i) > (ûki ) for all û i 2 L(û
k
i ). So, if û i 2 L then 
(ui; û i) > (û
k
i )
for all k 2 IN. Since limk!1 (ûki ) = (ui) this implies that 
(ui; û i)  (ui). Obviously,
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this contradicts (ui; û i) < (ui). Hence, L = ; so that 0 = i(ui)(L)  i(ui)(W )  0.
Consequently, h is not incentive compatible if we can show that i(ui)(W ) > 0.
In order to show thati(ui)(W ) > 0 for some i 2 N , take û 2 U such that(ûj) 6= (ûk)
for all j; k 2 N with j 6= k and such that the optimum premium (û) is unique. Take
i 2 N such that (ûi) = (û). So, (ûi) is the premium charged by the employer. Since
(ûj) 6= (ûk) for all j; k 2 N with j 6= k, there exists a utility function ui 2 Ui satisfying
(i) (ui; û i) = (ui), that is, (ui) is the premium that the employer charges for the
insurance when employee i reveals ui instead of ûi;
(ii) (ui) > (ûi);
(iii) for all j 2 N with (ûj) > (ûi) it holds that (ûj) > (ui).
Thus the maximum premium (ui) is chosen such that it is slightly greater than (ûi) and
such that (ui) is still optimal in state (ui; û i). So, we have that (ûi; û i) = (ûi) and
(ui; û i) = (ui).
Now, suppose that ui is employee i’s true utility function and that the other employees
report û i. Since the premium decreases from (ui) to (ûi) if employee i reveals ûi instead
of ui, employee i benefits from deviating. Hence, û i 2 W (ûi).
Next, consider employee j 6= i and let employee i report ui. If (ûj) > (ui) then (ui)
is still optimal if employee j reports any utility function vj satisfying(ui) < (vj)  (ûj). If
(ui) > (ûj) then (ui) is still optimal if employee j reports any utility function vj satisfying
(vj) < (ûj). The same result holds if employee i reports ûi.
Since employee j is risk averse we have that the maximum premium (vj) has some






(ûi) < (vj)  (ûj); if (ûj) > (ui)
lj < (vj)  (ûj); if (ûj) < (ui)
9>=
>; :
Since (ui; v i) = (ui) and (ûi; v i) = (ûi), employee i benefits from reporting ûi
instead of ui when v i 2 B. Hence, B  W (ûi). Moreover, f(v i)jv i 2 Bg is a
product of intervals with strictly positive Lebesgue measure. Thus, i(ui)(B) > 0 so that
i(ui)(W (ûi)) > 0.
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Now, let (ûki )k2IN be a sequence in Ui such that û
1
i = ûi, (û
k+1
i ) > (û
k
i ) for all k 2 IN,
and limk!1 (ûki ) = (ui). Then i(ui)(W )  i(ui)(W (û
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FIGURE 1: The relation between the reported premium and the optimal premium.
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